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SU M M A RY: The paper aims at providing an argument for a deflationary 
treatment of the notion of public language meaning. The argument is based 
on the notion of standards of correctness; I will try to show that as correctness 
assessments are context-involving, the notion of public language meaning 
cannot be treated as an explanatory one. An elaboration of the argument, 
using the notion of ground is provided. Finally, I will consider some limitations 
of the reasoning presented.
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INTRODUCTION
The aim of this paper is to provide an argument for the idea that the 
notion of public language meaning should be treated in a deflationary 
fashion. The argument is based on the notion of contextual standards 
of correctness. The argument is also intended as a partial response to 
the recent objection to deflationism raised by Stephen Schiffer. 
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First, I am going to provide a working definition of deflationism 
as applied to semantic notions in general, and elucidate the notion 
of public language meaning. Then, I am going to present Schiffer’s 
objection to deflationism. After that I’ll introduce the notion of 
standards of correctness, which plays a central role in the debates on 
normativity of meaning. This notion will be crucial in the argument 
for deflationism. Afterwards, I am going to present an elaboration 
of my argument, which is based on Kit Fine’s notion of ground. 
The next part will be devoted to an attempt to extend the line of 
argumentation to a broader range of phenomena, namely actions 
based on understanding public language expressions. In the final 
part of the paper I will show some limitations to the line of reasoning 
presented and an objection to it.
1. DEFINITION OF DEFLATIONISM
“Deflationism” is a term that has come to stand for a great variety of 
philosophical views in different areas of inquiry. In the present paper 
I shall be interested in deflationism understood as a theory concerning 
the status of semantic notions. The paradigmatic case here is truth 
– most of the early versions of deflationary theories were created as 
theories of this concept. However, nowadays it is not uncommon to 
see deflationism applied to other semantic notions, like meaning or 
reference (many examples of such approaches and their criticisms are 
discussed in a collection of essays in Gross, Tebben, Williams 2015). 
In what follows I will treat deflationism as a generic position, in 
principle acceptable to any semantic notion. I will also assume (although 
it might be controversial) that one can be semantic deflationist locally 
– i.e. only with respect to one of the semantic notions, while adopting 
a substantial theory to other such notions, or remaining neutral with 
respect to them.
Traditionally, deflationism about “S” was understood as the idea 
that there is no such property as S-hood; in the paradigmatic case 
of truth deflationism has been for a long time defined as a theory 
which simply denied that there is such property as being true (see e.g. 
Strawson 1950). 
This definition however, has led to some serious theoretical 
difficulties. The critics pointed out that it is not feasible to claim that 
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“true” does not refer to a property. If there is no such property as 
being true, the argument goes, then it would seem that the predicate 
“is true” would have an empty extension (see eg. Wright 1992). But this 
would amount to the claim that there are no true sentences whatsoever. 
Such a preposterous claim has never been intended to be made by 
deflationists, who clearly have not intended to develop a version of 
error theory concerning truth: i.e. a position which would claim that 
every sentence ascribing a value of truth to another sentence is false. 
Such a radical theory would most likely be inconsistent. Moreover, 
an error theory about truth is irreconcilable with our folk intuitions 
about the truth predicate (as the folk clearly believe that there are 
indeed true sentences), and most deflationists has been keen on trying 
to preserve our commonsense intuitions about the truth predicate. 
This argument seems to generalize other semantic notions. It would 
be quite bizarre to claim that there is no such property as reference, 
if this thesis were to be interpreted as the claim that nothing ever 
referred to anything. Again, this purely hypothetical position could be 
accused of inconsistency and it goes without saying that our everyday 
beliefs about reference defy it.
Considerations of these sorts have led most deflationists to the 
admission that “being true” indeed is a property, albeit only in minimal 
sense (see eg. Horwich 1998a). But once deflationists agree that there 
is such a property as “truth”, they owe us a clear conception of what 
makes their theory different from substantial theories of truth, which 
also claim that truth is a property.
The standard move here is to claim that what is characteristic to 
deflationism is the claim that although “truth” (or other semantic 
notion) denotes a property, the property in question is not a substantive 
one. This idea forces the deflationist to propose a criterion for 
distinguishing between substantive and non-substantive properties. 
This distinction is usually explicated in terms of explanatory relevance 
(see e.g. Horwich 1998a, Edwards 2013): substantive properties are 
thought to be those which are relevant in explanations of phenomena. 
Conversely, if a certain property is not relevant in explanatory practice 
then we should treat it as non-substantive.
Generalizing the conclusion from the previous paragraph, we 
might say that the point of controversy between a deflationist and 
a proponent of substantial theory concerning a given semantic term 
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“S” is whether one should treat the property S as explanatory relevant. 
The deflationist is the one who claims that although we might say 
that there is something like property S, and that the predicate “S” 
has a non-empty extension, there is no deep theoretical job for the 
property; we might use it as a purely logical device, but that is about 
it. The anti-deflationist, on the other hand, argues that the notion 
in question is needed for theoretical purposes and that invoking 
the property in question helps us to genuinely explain important 
phenomena. 
2. PUBLIC LANGUAGE MEANING AND DEFLATIONISM
The semantic notion I wish to focus on is public language meaning. 
I do not intend to provide a formal definition of this notion, but only an 
informal elucidation, which I hope would be sufficient for the purposes 
of the paper. The basic idea is that when we ask about a meaning of 
an expression, we might distinguish between an idiolectical meaning, 
which is specific to a single user, and a meaning which is bestowed 
upon an expression by a wider community. A well-worn example 
of that distinction is that of malapropisms: in one’s idiolect it might 
be well true that “eventually” has the same meaning as “actually”, 
whereas in standard public English of the educated Anglo-American 
population these two words have clearly different meanings. 
It is important to note that the distinction between idiolectical and 
public language meaning is different from the well-known distinction 
between a speaker’s meaning and semantic meaning (see Kripke 
1977). The speaker’s meaning is the meaning of an expression as used 
by a speaker in a given context. Both idiolectical meaning and public 
language meaning are subspecies of semantic meaning, i.e. both are 
meanings which are systematically attributable to the expression, 
rather than being properties of individual use. The difference between 
them lies in the fact that while idiolectical use traces patterns of use of 
a single individual, the public one traces the patterns of use of a wider 
community.
Deflationism about public language meaning is, then, a position 
according to which public language meaning is a non-substantive 
notion, which means that public language meaning should not be 
treated as relevant in explanations of any interesting phenomena. 
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Such a position has already been presented in the literature as 
the minimalist interpretation of the so-called “sceptical solution” of 
the sceptical problem presented by Saul Kripke in his reading 
of Wittgenstein’s remarks of following a rule. As it is well known the 
“Kripkensteinian” sceptic questioned whether there is any fact that 
determines the meaning of any expression (Kripke 1982). In the most 
famous example, the sceptic claimed that nothing determines whether 
the symbol “+” means “plus”, as there is no way of excluding the 
possibility that this symbol denotes some other function, say quus, i.e. 
a function which yields the same results as plus when the arguments 
are lower than an arbitrary number, and yields 5 in other cases.
Kripke presents his owns answer to this challenge and dubs it the 
“sceptical solution”. Its basic claim is that there indeed are no facts 
determining meaning of an expression, but nonetheless there is room 
for claiming that certain semantic attributions are correct (according 
to the communal standards of correctness). Moreover, Kripke (1982, 
p. 86) claims that redundancy theory of truth can be applied to such 
semantic attributions. Some authors have claimed that these remarks 
are best understood as putting forward a deflationary account of 
meaning (see e.g. Byrne 1996, Kusch 2006, Wilson 1998). According 
to them, what Kripkenstein really denies is the existence of robust/
substantial semantic fact, but his sceptical solution allows for the 
existence of deflationary/minimal semantic facts. 
In my paper I am not going to engage in exegesis of Kripke’s 
notoriously vague arguments. Instead, I am about to provide a new 
argument for the deflationary approach to public language meaning. 
Although this argument is not intended to be an interpretation of 
Kripke, it draws some inspiration from his work. But before I do that, 
I shall look at Stephen Schiffer’s recent critique of deflationism, which, 
I believe, provides an important dialectical setting for the discussion.
But before we proceede, it is important to note that the definition of 
deflationism about public language meaning presented in this paper 
is distinct from the perhaps more well known version of deflationism 
about meaning, namely the one promoted by Paul Horwich. The 
basic tenet of Horwich’s theory is that we should explain meaning in 
terms of a basic acceptance property, which in turns allows us to claim 
that the primary meaning of an expression is a concept expressed by 
it (Horwich 1998b, p. 45–46). Such a theory allows him to describe 
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meanings in terms of biconditionals like “dog” means DOG, where 
DOG is a concept. 
The difference between the approaches preferred by Horwich and 
the one I want to pursue here, stems, in my opinion, from the fact that 
I am primarily interested in the metaphysical status of the putative 
meaning-property, i.e. in a meta-semantic problem, while Horwich 
wants to provide a (first-order) theory of meaning. In my opinion 
causal relevance is a plausible candidate for a test to distinguish between 
those properties which are to be treated in a deflationary manner and 
those properties which are to be treated in a strongly realist fashion. 
Thus, focusing on a question of whether public language meaning is 
causally relevant is the best way to answer the meta-semantic question 
whether we are dealing with a “substantial property” here. 
Paradoxically enough, on my definition Horwich’s theory turns 
out to be a non-deflationary one, as he admits that there are indeed 
such things as meaning-properties; moreover, these properties have 
an underlying nature and those “underlying natures of meaning-
properties are basic regularities of use, explanatorily fundamental 
generalizations about the circumstances in which words occur” 
(Horwich 1995, p. 356). The complaint that Horwich’s theory 
of meaning is not in fact deflationary was raised by Huw Price 
(1998, p. 111). Price claimed that Horwich’s use of “deflationism” 
is significantly different when it is applied to “meaning” and not to 
“truth”.
Horwich seems to be mostly interested in providing a philosophical 
account of meaning and less with its metaphysical implications. 
I have no intention of providing such an account. Hence, I will not 
try to engage in the debate, whether, for example, it is possible to 
characterize meaning of an expression using a biconditional modeled 
on the T-schema of Tarski (see Horwich 1998b, p. 14). On my take, 
deflationism is a negative meta-semantic thesis and is not inherently 
tied to any account of meaning. I think adopting such definition of 
public language deflationism, although it might differ from other 
accounts of that position, is theoretically fruitful, as it takes public 
meaning deflationism a special case of a generic position. This position 
deserves critical attention, especially in the light of the recent Schiffer’s 
critique. 
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3. SCHIFFER’S WORRY
In his Deflationist Theories of Truth, Meaning, and Content (forthcoming) 
Stephen Schiffer argues against the idea that semantic notions should 
be given deflationary treatment. He opposes “radical deflationism” 
– a strictly defined, globally applicable, hypothetical position (based, 
to an extent, on Harty Field’s views). So, my defense of a modest, 
local, deflationism about public language meaning is not in direct 
opposition to Schiffer’s work. 
However, Schiffer’s arguments provide, in my opinion, a substantial 
challenge to all forms of deflationism – even those more locally focused. 
The line of argumentation provided in his paper is fairly intricate, but 
a quite simple, yet powerful argument can be extracted from it, and it 
is a one that all deflationists should take seriously. 
According to Schiffer, the deflationists claim that it is possible to 
explain human language-related behaviour without referring to any 
semantic properties. But for Schiffer such a project is unrealistic. In 
everyday practice it is perfectly normal to explain human behaviour 
by resorting to semantic properties of the expressions used. And there 
is no principled reason to treat such explanations as defective (apart 
from general worries about causal exclusion, which Schiffer dismisses). 
The other worry is that deflationism provides us with no workable 
alternative to the common practice; in those cases when we normally 
appeal to semantic properties, we do not have any practically applicable 
methods of explaining human behaviour other than the ones that we 
actually employ, and these are laden with semantic properties. 
In my paper I am going to focus on the first part of the challenge. 
At first glance, the Schiffer’s worry might look as a pretty weak 
argument, as it relies on description of de facto existing explanatory 
practices (and who can be sure that our actual, pre-scientific ways 
of explaining phenomena are above criticism?). But I think this is 
indeed quite a powerful argument. It aims to show that deflationism 
is an under-motivated position, as it provides no reason to think that 
appeals to the semantic in explanatory practice are defective. And that 
the alternative – namely substantial theories of the semantic – have 
had the advantage of already being tried in working practice.
To counter this line of reasoning, a deflationist must present 
an argument which would provide motivation for their position. 
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In what follows I am going to provide an argument which aims to 
counter the intuitions Schiffer’s argument wanted to induce. At the 
heart of Schiffers argument seems to be that we must treat meaning 
as substantial as it plays an important causal-explanatory role in 
psychological explanations. So, my argument would aim to show that, 
appearances to the contrary, the notion of public language meaning 
plays no important role in causally explaining human-language related 
behaviour. This argument will be based on the notion of standards 
of correctness, which is central to the contemporary debates about 
normativity of meaning. 
4. STANDARDS OF CORRECTNESS
The idea that expressions of public language have conditions of 
correct use is central to the debates on normativity of meaning. The 
claim that meaning is normative, once considered obvious (see e.g. 
Kripke 1982, McDowell 1984), has been subject to many criticisms 
more recently (see e.g. Hattiangadi 2006, Glüer, Pagin 1999). At the 
heart of the debate lies the question whether meaning is normative in 
a “strong” or “philosophically interesting” sense. There are, of course, 
many ways one might precisify the normativity claim and different 
arguments has been waged for and against the normativist thesis (for 
a recent defense of normativism see e.g. Whiting 2007).
What is curious about the debate is that both sides of it seem to 
agree on a basic intuition that there is something like correct and 
incorrect use of language. (The only prominent philosopher who 
had qualms about this thesis was probably Davidson (2005)). The 
basic idea is quite straightforward: when a user of a public language 
uses a certain expression, we, as other users of the same language 
are entitled to judge this use as correct or incorrect, according to the 
semantic norms of the language in question. This shared assumption 
is central to the argument that I am going to present.
This fact might well be regarded as constitutive of notion of public 
language meaning. It is only possible to claim that the phenomenon 
we are dealing with is indeed a public language if there are standards 
of correct use associated with it. (This might, at least partially, explain 
why Davidson ended up claiming that there is no such thing as 
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language (Davidson 2005) – as he denied that there is such a thing as 
standards of correct use).
The observation that there are standards of correcteness might 
seem relatively trivial and not particularly relevant to the deflationism 
debate. But in my opinion this is a crucial fact. I claim that standards 
of correctness of any public language are context-involving, in the 
sense that they include factors external to the current, internal state of 
the speaker. In order to appraise someone’s use of language we must 
look beyond what is, at the moment of an utterance, going on in the 
head of the speaker. 
I should try to argue for this claim by way of analogy. It is widely 
accepted in the literature on normativity of meaning that semantic 
norms can be compared to institutional ones (this is accepted by 
normativist and anti-normativists alike). Hattiangadi (2006, p. 63) 
made an analogy with a theme park where there is a rule stating that 
only kids of a certain height can go on the ride. This example serves 
Hattiangadi to criticize normativism; she focuses her attention on the 
observation that in this case the height of a child is a purely naturalistic 
characteristic of her/him. 
Still, this example can be used to highlight a different aspect of 
the correctness condition thesis. If we look only at the purely internal 
characteristic of the child then we are in no position to judge whether 
she or he is of the “right height” – we might only be able to provide 
with a purely physical description of the child. In order to get to know 
whether we are dealing with a case that is “correct” according to the 
rules that are in force, we must look at other factors than the subject 
itself (in this case we must, obviously, look at the regulations of the 
theme park).
I think this observation generalizes to all cases of institutional 
correctness. Whenever there are some institutional rules in force 
(no matter whether trivial or serious) that allow us to judge certain 
actions as correct or not, the judgment must be based on comparing 
an agent’s actions with the rules in question. These rules must refer 
to at least some factors external to the agents which are being judged 
as acting correctly or not. This is crucial because otherwise it would 
be impossible for one to act incorrectly. And this very possibility of 
incorrectness is something which makes the very assessment possible. 
For if it were impossible for one to act incorrectly, the very notion 
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of correctness in this context would have no sense. Wittgenstein has 
famously described such a situation as the one in which “whatever is 
going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we 
can’t talk about «right»” (Wittgenstein 1953, § 258).
So, if we agree that language rules are akin to institutional rules, 
then we should also admit that the linguistic norms are in a way external 
to the speakers. This observation seems obvious for every proponent 
of externalist theories of meaning. According to externalism the facts 
that determine correctness conditions for language use are external 
to the speaker, as they include either social facts (as social externalist, 
of the type of Burge proposed) or facts about the kinds of things that 
are in the physical surroundings of the language user (as natural-kind 
externalists of the Putnamian kind assert).
But for internalists the thesis that standards of semantic correctness 
are context involving might not be that obvious. For the theorist of 
internalist inclination wants to explain meaning purely in terms of 
psychological states of the speakers. However, in my opinion, even 
someone who believes that language meaning is determined by purely 
psychological factors must admit that some factors, which are relevant 
to the assessment of expressions, are in a way external to the agent 
using language in a certain situation. This is due to the fact that even 
an internalist wants to maintain the distinction between correct and 
incorrect use. 
Therefore, what such a theorist needs is a distinction between 
the psychological state of the user while making an utterance and 
a psychological state, which determines the correctness conditions for 
the use. I think that this distinction is implicit in most internalistic 
theories of meaning. Usually, it is introduced by postulating a time 
difference between the act of use (and associated psychological 
states) and meaning-determining psychological states. Put simply, the 
internalist usually claims that meaning is determined by meaning-
intentions, which are made previous to the acts of use. What serves 
as the standards of correctness for my current use are the meaning 
intentions which I have made in the past. And this time difference 
allows for that correct/incorrect distinction. For I might presently act 
in a different manner than I intended in the past. 
This time distinction lies at the heart of many of the examples 
Kripke offers in his discussion on rule-following. Even the most 
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famous “plus” – “quus” example plays on the fact that my present use 
of the symbol “+” might deviate from my previous intention: what 
makes the putative subject, and who uses the symbol in a quus-like 
way err in the fact that she is unfaithful to her previous intention to 
use the symbol in a “standard” way. 
The general picture of meaning which I am going to presuppose 
in the next sections of the paper might be then described as broadly 
externalist. This broad conception of externalism includes many 
conceptions of what might have been traditionally described as 
internalist. The position I am putting forward is to a great extent 
a schematic one – it insists only on the claim that whenever we want 
to ascribe a public meaning to a certain expression we must implicitly 
accept that there is something external to the occurrent psycho-
functional state of the speaker which is to be taken as a standard of 
correctness. But this schematic theory remains neutral to the question 
of what these standards of correctness are in particular cases. Even 
on a more general level the conception presupposed in this paper 
remains neutral to the question whether say, Kripke’s conception of 
natural kind terms is the correct theory of reference for terms like 
“gold” or “water”. So, the phrase “contextual standards of correctness” 
should be treated as a sort of theoretical place-holder, whereby various 
externalist theories of meaning might fill in different ways.
It might also be useful to distinguish between two general kinds 
of broadly externalist approaches2: according to the first it is the 
standards of correctness that are external to the speaker. In the other 
what is external to the speaker are the norms stating what contextual 
elements are to be taken into consideration when assessing a certain 
utterance. My position is obviously externalist in the first sense; I claim 
that for each language use there is something “outside the head” of 
the speaker with which his use is to be compared. The second sort 
of externalism claims that the norms of correctness are constituted 
externally – for example by the societal agreement. This version of 
externalism seems to be plausible when we theorize about public 
language, but, as I want to stress, this is not an assumption which is 
needed in order for the argument of the next section to be sound. 
2 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to this 
point. 
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5. THE ARGUMENT
In this section I am going to provide an argument to the effect that 
public language meaning should be given a deflationary treatment, 
which is based on the premise that meaning involves contextual 
standards of correctness. 
First, let me introduce some definitions. I will use “E” to denote 
an expression fact, i.e. the fact that a particular language user used 
a given expression at a particular occasion. “M” will be used to denote 
the fact (or the totality of facts) that determines the public language 
meaning of the expression used in E. 
This description of “M” is deliberately vague, as I want to be as non-
committal as possible with regard to the different theories of meaning. 
I shall not argue that either of the numerous theories of meaning is 
correct or not. Rather, I should use “M” as a sort of place-holder, 
which denotes states postulated by whichever theory of meaning 
comes out right.
I should understand “P” as a psychological-functional state that is 
causally responsible for the agent’s utterance in E. This again is a vague 
description, as the exact description of what is the character of states that 
are causally responsible for linguistic utterances is still largely unknown. 
Still, even if P and M are only vaguely characterized, I think it is possible 
to try to establish certain truths about relations between them. 
My hypotheses concerning the relations between these two kinds of 
facts are the following:
First and foremost, M cannot be identified with P. This is because, 
as the second claim goes, P is doing all the causal-explanatory work, 
and M does none.
The transition from the second thesis to the first one is fairly 
straightforward. If two putative facts differ when it comes to their 
causal-explanatory role, then we might safely assume that we are 
indeed dealing with two different facts and any attempt to identify 
them would be mistaken. 
So, the crucial task is to justify the second thesis that it is P that 
is relevant in providing causal explanation to the Es, while M is not. 
Again the first part of the task seems relatively easy: Ps are causally 
relevant to the linguistic production by definition. So, what needs to 
be justified is the claim that Ms are not. 
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This can be supported by an observation that in a given situation 
we can keep P fixed, while M changes – a subject can be in the same 
current, internal state (and thus produce the same expressions) and 
mean different things, depending on context. 
Let us consider the plus vs. quus example. Kripke (1982, p. 8) 
invites us to consider a counterfactual situation in which the “+” sign 
really means quus not plus. In such a situation a subject might have 
used the sign “+” in a way as we actually use it: namely, as if the 
symbol denoted addiction. Such a person would commit an error 
according to the standards which are in force in her public language, 
but it is quite possible that her internal psycho-functional state at the 
time of making the utterance would be identical with someone’s from 
our linguistic community which would perform a standard addition.
So, there is a possibility of there being two persons who are identical 
with respect to their linguistic beahaviour and psycho-functional 
causes of it, but whose expressions in the relevant situations have 
different meanings. This is obviously a direct consequence of the claim 
that the standards of correctness are contextually determined. In this 
case these contextual factors might include community agreement, 
previous intentions or objective mathematical facts.
Examples might be multiplied. The famed Burge’s thought 
experiment of arthritis can be used to prove a similar point – 
depending on the contextual factors, the patient who classifies any 
pain in the tight as “arthritis” (Burge 1979) might be treated as using 
the world correctly or not. In our actual community this is of course 
an incorrect use, but it is not hard to imagine a different community, 
in which “arthritis” is used in a way the discussed subject uses it. In 
all such cases it is not the psycho-functional state of the speaker that 
influences the meaning, but rather external, contextual factors. 
Now, the converse situation is also possible. We might easily 
imagine two subjects whose utterances have the same meanings (so we 
have identical Ms), while their Ps are different. This is because, once 
we allow for the possibility of error, we must admit that the psycho-
functional which lead to correct and erroneous linguistic use are 
indeed quite different (the psycho-functional state which leads one to 
use “+” as a quus-denoting symbol is obviously rather different from 
one which leads the “normal” user who uses “+” to simply add). But we 
must admit that when we have two uses of the same expressions made 
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in the context of the same public language then they have the same 
meaning, even though one of the uses is incorrect. So, in the example 
discussed, the fact that someone uses the “+” symbol incorrectly does 
not (in a normal situation) change the public language meaning of the 
symbol. It still means plus, even if an erratic user uses it in a quus-like 
pattern. 
This is important, because the whole idea of meaning involving 
correctness conditions leads inevitably to the conclusion that even 
wildly erring usage does not change the meaning of the expression 
used. If this was not so, we would lose the possibility of error: if 
deviation from the standards of correctness led to the alteration of 
meaning of expressions then it would be impossible to use linguistic 
expressions incorrectly. 
These considerations prove that there are two kinds of possible 
situations. In the first type, there are two possible subjects, who share 
the same P-state, but there expressions have different meanings. In 
the situation of the second type, there are possible subjects who use the 
same expression with the same meaning but their psycho-functional 
states differ. So, it is possible to have the same Ps with different Ms and 
vice versa. But, what is crucial, in both of the situations it is the change 
in Ps which causes the change in behaviour. Change of meaning, 
which is not accompanied by the change in the psycho-functional state 
of the user, has, in itself, no causal impact on linguistic behaviour. 
Additionally, in order to cause the change in the use, the change in 
psycho-functional state does not need to be accompanied by a change 
in meaning.
This shows clearly, in my opinion, that we should take psycho-
functional states rather than public language meanings of the 
expressions to be the causes of linguistic behaviour. But, this conclusion 
seems enough to justify a deflationary approach to public language 
meaning (as defined in the section II). 
It is important to note that the argument presented is not 
a straightforward variant of the causal-exclusion argument, which has 
been extensively discussed in the philosophy of mind. I do not intend 
to claim that only physical or “basic” properties are causally relevant. 
On the contrary, I am open to the possibility that psycho-functional 
characteristics might not be reducible to the physical ones. The 
contrast between the psycho-functional properties and the semantic 
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ones is not the contrast between “ontological levels”. It is rather 
a matter of granularity of descriptions. When we describe expressions 
as correct and incorrect, we describe them taking a broader context 
into account, while descriptions of psycho-functional states abstract 
from the contextual elements.
6. ELABORATION
In this section, I am going to present a simple metaphysical model 
which is an elaboration of the argument presented above and which 
would aim at explaining two things. Firstly, why we should treat public 
language meaning in a deflationary way, and secondly, why we treat 
public language meaning as explanatory in our everyday practice.
The model will use Kit Fine’s notion of ground (Fine 2001). 
According to Fine, the relation of grounding is a basic metaphysical 
one: if A grounds B, then B obtains in virtue of A. This relation 
eschews a straightforward definition as it is metaphysically basic. Still, 
it can illuminate the question of realism. According to Fine, we should 
treat certain propositions in a realist fashion when they are either 
metaphysically basic and factual (Fine 2001, p. 17) or are grounded in 
some basic and factual propositions. But if there are no real grounds 
for certain propositions then we might claim that these are not factual 
propositions. It is an important feature of Fine’s proposal that it 
makes room for grounding relation between non-factual elements as 
well (Fine 2001, p. 17). So, when we are dealing with a non-factual 
proposition we might make hypotheses about which constitutive 
elements of a given proposition make it non-factual.
Let us try to apply the notion of ground to the phenomena 
discussed in this paper. My hypothesis is that P (a psycho-functional 
state of the speaker) is a partial ground for M (the meaning of the 
expression used). But it is important to bear in mind that it is only 
partial ground. The other fact that partially grounds M-facts concerns 
the contextual factors which serve as correctness conditions. 
Both P-facts and contextual factors might be treated as factual. Yet 
I claim that Ms are non-factual, even though they are grounded in Ps 
and contextual factors, which are both factual. So, in order to support 
the claim that Ms are non-factual, it is necessary to postulate a non-
factual element which also grounds them.
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In my opinion such a non-factual element is the relation between 
E and, by extension, P and the contextual standards of correctness. 
This is a relation of “being a standard of correctness for”. Even if we 
take that the terms of said relation to be perfectly factual in Fine’s 
sense, there seems to be little motivation to take the relation itself to be 
factual. That a certain element of the context is taken to provide the 
benchmark of correct use of a given expression seems to be an utterly 
conventional matter. Moreover, this relation seems to have no causal-
explanatory import. 
Such relations might be taken to ground the putative meaning-
facts. The fact that a certain expression means something is 
rooted in the relation which binds the expression to the standard 
of correctness; that my utterance of the symbol “+” in a given 
context, means plus, is grounded by the relation of this utterance 
to the standard of correctness (say, my previous meaning-intention). 
Should this relation be different, the meaning of my utterance would 
be different as well.
This model, in my opinion, allows us to elevate the worry presented 
by Schiffer. The question was: Why do we treat public language meaning 
as explanatory, when it is not, at least according to the deflationists? 
And the answer is: Because public language meaning is partially 
grounded by something that really plays the causal explanatory work 
– namely the psycho-functional states of the speakers. And it seems to 
be quite normal that in everyday explanations we treat “broader” facts 
as explanations, especially in the situations when we lack access to the 
“fine-grained” facts. We do not normally know anything about the 
psycho-functional states of ourselves and fellow language users, so we 
resort to explanations in terms of public language meaning. In doing 
so, we tacitly assume that these meaning facts are somehow rooted in 
“something in the head” of the speaker, which is the genuine cause of 
their behaviour. 
Schiffer might be perfectly right that we have no realistic 
alternative to meaning-based explanations, which could be used in 
everyday practice. Explanations resorting to the psycho-functional 
states might be practically unattainable. However, I do not think this 
is a fatal objection to deflationism, as it is meant to be a metaphysical 
position regarding the nature of semantic predicates, not a practically 
applicable theory.
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7. UNDERSTANDING AND ACTION: REMAINING PROBLEMS
The arguments presented in this paper might be easily attacked 
for not being general enough. They might be said to show that public 
language meaning is not relevant in providing causal explanations of 
linguistic production. But this is not the only possible use of meaning in 
explaining human behaviour. To my knowledge, none of the existing 
inflationist theorists of meaning have treated the role of meaning in 
explaining linguistic production as the main reason for treating the 
public language meaning in substantial fashion. But, I believe, the 
argument I presented against treating public language meaning as 
explanatory in the context of language production can be applied to 
other cases, where one might want to treat this concept as relevant in 
causal psychological explanation.
For Schiffer the central observation speaking in favour of treating 
the semantic properties as substantial was that we explain action by 
reference to the fact that a person understands a certain expression 
in a certain way. When applied to the problem of status of public 
language meaning, Schiffer’s insight might be understood as follows: 
the fact of understanding, which explains some action of some objects, 
stems from the fact that the expressions mean something in a given 
public language. Thus, public language meaning plays an important 
role in explaining behaviour. 
This might sound terribly complicated, but the phenomenon is in 
fact quite easy and commonplace. For example, when we want to know 
why the children in the classroom sat down it is perfectly legitimate to 
say that they did so because the teacher said to them “asseyez vous” 
and this phrase means “please sit down” in French.
Meaning can thus enter the explanation of action differently than 
by explaining linguistic production. But if this kind of explanation is 
a legitimate one, then deflationism about public language meaning is 
in serious trouble, because it turns out that meaning is actually needed 
in explanation of some language-related phenomena.
The question then arises whether the argument presented in the 
previous sections of this paper can also be generalized as to cover the 
cases in which meaning is used to explain actions which stem from 
understanding expressions of public language. In what follows I will 
try to formulate such an argument.
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The reasoning will be similar in spirit to the one presented in 
the section 5, and it will also be based on the notion of standards of 
correctness. This is because understanding public language expressions 
is subject to the assessment in terms of correctness, in a similar way 
linguistic production is. A subject might understand a certain public 
language expression correctly or not, and this observation seems to be 
central to the notion of a public language meaning.
The possibility of error is clearly visible when we focus on 
understanding expressions made in a foreign public language 
– it is quite common for people who are not native speakers to 
misunderstand expressions of a given language. But even within our 
own native language there is always the possibility of understanding 
an expression differently than in a way prescribed by standards of 
correctness operating in said public language.
In such situations we should distinguish between the meaning of 
the public expression used and the act of understanding, which is 
a psycho-functional state of the speaker. Again, I should argue that 
these two facts must be considered as distinct. Moreover, it is the 
psycho-functional state of understanding that is causally responsible 
for the actions of the users. I shall try to prove this using an example. 
Take Tom, a native English user who is quite ignorant of the 
vernacular used to denote different kinds of seafood. He sees “crayfish” 
on a restaurant menu and understands this expression as a name 
of a kind of fish dish. As he strongly dislikes fish, he decides not to 
order. However, he is a great fan of seafood, and if he were to believe 
that the dish is a kind of seafood he would most likely order it. But 
misinterpreting the expression of his own public language prevented 
him from acting on his preferences.
Again, the examples might be multiplied, but I guess it is not necessary. 
It is quite easy to note that the fact that misunderstandings are possible 
leads to the conclusion that the subjective act of understanding must be 
taken to be distinct from the public language meaning and whatever 
constitutes it. And when it comes to its relevance in causal explanations 
it is the subjective act of understanding which might reasonably claim 
priority; in the situations when one misunderstands the expressions the 
subject will act on her subjective psycho-functional state. 
A public language meaning that is not mediated by the act of 
subjective understanding seems to have no direct influence on the 
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actions of the subject. Therefore, the deflationary position concerning 
this notion seems justified, even if we take into account the phenomenon 
of actions based on understanding expressions of public language.
8. THE OVER-GENERALIZATION CHALLENGE
The argument presented in this paper can be also attacked for being, 
as it were, too general. The problem is that the line of argumentation 
presented in section 5 can be quite easily extended to other domains, 
in which the conclusion might seem implausible3.
The basic idea of the argument, to put it briefly, was that meaning 
is, at least partly, determined by contextual factors. And given this 
fact, we might observe that meaning cannot be thought to be causally 
responsible for actions of language users. This is because the mere 
change in contextual factors does not, by itself, change the behaviour. 
The change in linguistic action is brought upon by the change in 
the functional-internal state of the speaker. And this state cannot be 
identified with meaning.
The worry is that a similar argument can be produced in all 
contexts of institutional norms. Every fact that an institutional norm 
is in force is analogous to linguistic meaning in that respect that in 
involves a relation of the subject whose behaviour is governed by 
a given norm to some contextual standard of correctness. Let us take 
a standard example of institutional norms – road traffic rules. When 
we say that someone acted incorrectly according to the traffic rules, we 
compare the subject’s beahviour with some contextual standard. The 
same behaviour can be described as correct or not depending on the 
context in which the assessment is made (driving on the left is correct 
in the UK but wrong in continental Europe and so on).
Again, as in the case of meaning, the change in context does not, by 
itself, change behaviour. This leads to the conclusion that institutional 
rules are not explanatorily relevant (when contrasted with psycho-
functional states of the subjects). Consequently, we should claim that 
all institutional rules are to be treated in a deflationary fashion. But 
this might seem counterintuitive: it would mean that institutional 
rules do not have any impact on the actions of people.
3 I am very grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this point. 
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There are two possible ways to answer this challenge. The first 
would be a direct rebuke to show that the analogy does not hold – 
that there is a deep theoretical difference between the way language 
operates and the way other institutional discourses and facts do. This 
would be a strategy of containment of deflationism to the linguistic 
realm.
Unfortunately, I do not see how this could be done. The argument 
presented above in no way is based on peculiar characteristics of 
language. The argument relied only on the fact that the norms of 
language are institutional ones. So, if the argument is correct it should 
indeed be generalized to all forms of institutional rules. Thus, I must 
bite the bullet and say that my argument leads to global deflationism 
about the institutional.
This is certainly an implausible conclusion for many theorists, but 
it might be noted that a deflationary approach to institutional and 
legal facts might not be an entirely groundless position and there are 
philosophers who seem to endorse it. One recent example of such an 
approach might be found in Thomasson (2013). For her, deflationism 
about the institutional and the legal is a welcome consequence of her 
globally deflationary approach to metaphysics. In the context of the 
philosophy of law, James Coleman (1995) argued that Dworkin’s views 
could be viewed as a form of deflationism.
Of course, the question whether the deflationary account of the 
legal and the institutional in general is an acceptable one is extremely 
puzzling, and answering it would require a separate paper. But I want 
to stress that even though deflationism in these areas might seem 
intuitively implausible, it seems to be a real option on the theoretical 
level. 
9. CONCLUSIONS
The fact that the notion of public language meaning essentially 
involves standards of correctness allowed me to present an argument 
to the effect that public language meaning is not causally explanatory, 
even though in everyday use we might treat it as it actually were. 
This reasoning applies both to explanations of linguistic production 
and actions based on understanding, which we would normally make 
using the notion of public language meaning. This conclusion gives us 
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a strong reason to accept the deflationary account of public language 
meaning, as the point of contention between deflationists, as defined 
in this paper, and proponents of a substantial theory regarding a given 
semantic notion is whether the notion in question is relevant in causal 
explanations of the phenomena.
However, the line of argumentation presented in this paper 
has some serious limitations. Firstly, it might well be the case that 
there are some other ways in which the notion of public language 
meaning comes into explanatory practice, and the kind of argument 
which has been developed above has no application to them. So, the 
argument might be, at best, treated as a shift of burden of proof. The 
adherent of substantial theory of public language meaning must, in 
response to it, show which phenomena need explanation in terms of 
this notion.
The other limitation of the argument is that it is, in a way, a local 
one. It does not extend to semantic notions other than public language 
meaning, which leaves open the question of whether, for example, 
idiolectical meaning or semantic properties of propositional attitudes 
should not be treated in a substantive fashion. Moreover, the line of 
reasoning presented here relies on the notion of an internal psycho-
functional state which is assumed to explain the language-related 
behaviour. But nothing in what has been argued for suggests that this 
kind of state cannot have semantic properties. But if this is so, the only 
upshot of this paper would be that substantial semantic properties 
must be located on the psychological level and not on the level of 
public language meaning.
This might seem too modest a conclusion for a deflationist, as 
it leaves room for a substantial account of at least some semantic 
properties. So, we are left with the question; is it possible to mount 
a more general argument which would show that semantic properties 
are not substantial ones? This is an extremely complicated issue and 
I will not try to resolve it in the present paper. Still, I believe that even 
a partially applicable argument can shed some light on the immensely 
intricate problem of deflationism.
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